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Rish v. Simao, 132 Nev. Adv. Op. 17 (Mar. 17, 2016)1
TORTS
Summary
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the District Court wrongly excluded evidence of
low-impact defense when it required a biomechanical expert testify about the nature of the
accident, erroneously interpreting Hallmark v. Eldgridge 2 Instead, Hallmark requires sufficient
foundation for admission of testimony and evidence, specifically excluding a biomechanical
expert’s testimony under NRS 50.275. The Court additionally held that the District Court erred
when it ultimately struck the defendant’s answer for violations of the pretrial order precluding
defendant from raising a minor or low impact defense.
Background
Jenny Rish rear-ended William Simao on April 15, 2005 in stop-and-go traffic. Rish had
passengers in her vehicle, Simao did not. Neither vehicle sustained significant damage and
although ambulances were called to the scene, none involved in the accident went to the hospital.
Simao later alleged painful head and neck injures, requiring continuing medical treatment. He
brought suit against Rish to recover damages for his injuries while his wife, Cheryl, brought suit
to recover for loss of consortium.
Before trial, the Simaos brought a motion in limine asking the District Court to prohibit
any testimony that the accident was not significant enough to cause William’s injuries (the “lowimpact defense”). Citing Hallmark,3 Simao argued that because Rish failed to include a
biomechanical expert’s testimony about whether the accident was low-impact or not, the defense
was precluded. Rish opposed the motion, asserting that doctors are usually allowed to testify
about injuries sustained during an accident.
The District Court agreed with Simao that Rish could not lay the foundation for a low
impact defense without a biomechanical expert, therefore prohibiting Rish’s medical expert, Dr.
Fish, and her other experts from testifying to that effect. The District Court additionally excluded
photographs of the cars and invoices regarding property damages.
During opening statements, Rish’s attorney described the accident without objection.
Included in his description were the following facts: all at the scene denied help from the
paramedics, Rish’s car was operable and she drove it away, and no one claimed to lose
consciousness. Rish’s attorney later faced objections, and was ultimately threatened with a
progressive sanction order, when he asked Simao’s physician experts about Rish and her
passengers or whether Simao was transported to the hospital by ambulance.
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The District Court ultimately decided that Rish violated the pretrial order denying the
low-impact defense eight times. These violations included: (1) Rish’s attempt to play a
videotaped deposition during opening statements, (2) four questions posed by Rish’s attorney to
Simao and his experts asking what happened to Rish following the accident, (3) questions posed
by Rish’s attorney to Simao about the traffic during the accident, and (4) Dr. Fish’s answers
during either cross or redirect. Because of these violations, the District Court granted Simao’s
motion to strike Rish’s answer, entering default against Rish and dismissing the jury.
The District Court awarded damages after a prove-up hearing.4 The damages included the
following: for William Simao, (1) $194,390.96 for past medical expenses; (2) $1,378,209 for
past pain, suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life; (3) $1,140,552 for future pain, suffering, and
loss of enjoyment of life; to Cheryl Simao: $681,286 for loss of consortium; and attorney’s fees:
$1,078,125; for a total of close to $4.5 million. Rish appealed.
Discussion
On appeal, Rish challenged the District Court’s order of final sanctions striking her
answer and entering a default. The question posed to the Nevada Supreme Court was whether it
was erroneous to exclude the evidence of her low-impact defense as a matter of law.
The district court erred in extending Hallmark to preclude all argument of a low-impact defense
While the trial court can broadly determine whether or not to admit or exclude evidence,5
the higher court will overturn that decision when the district court abuses that discretion.6
The District Court incorrectly relied on Hallmark when excluding evidence of a lowimpact defense. Hallmark held that because he failed to review important information when
forming his opinion, a physician (who was also a mechanical engineer) could not testify whether
an accident was too low-impact to cause injuries.7 Additionally, because the biomechanical
engineer’s testimony was less science based and more supposition based, he was not a qualified
expert under NRS 50.275.8 Finally, in Hallmark, the expert could not testify because testimony
could not be tested and his theories and methods were not subject to peer review.9 What
Hallmark requires is that all expert testimony have a sufficient foundation on which to base
testimony.10
A low-impact defense does not require testimony from a certified biomechanical engineer
or other similar expert.11 Requiring testimony from this type of expert deprives juries of hearing
about the accident and other injuries without an expert first explaining it. As it is up to the jury to
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determine which testimony is credible and how to weigh the evidence, not allowing it to hear this
evidence is impermissible.12 Additionally, the jury decides causation and taking away its ability
to make this determination is in error.13
Medical doctors can explain injuries to the jury.14 Not only is this common practice in
other jurisdictions, but Hallmark explained that the if the expert proffered by the defense, also a
medical doctor, had either examined the plaintiff or reviewed her medical records, he could
testify as a means of laying a proper causation foundation.15 Therefore, a medical doctor is
allowed to testify about causation, so long as a proper foundation is also laid.
The district court erred in striking the answer
Validity of sanctions are reviewed with heightened scrutiny16 and, even if the order is in
error, the party under a sanction order must follow it unless the order is overturned or it ends.17
Following the factors enumerated in Young v. Johnny Ribeiro Building, Inc.,18 the District Court
issued a written order granting Simao’s motion to strike Rish’s answer. In finding that Rish
violated the pretrial order eight times,19 the District Court granted the motion to strike, dismissed
the jury and entered a default judgment for Simao and his wife.
However, for violations of an order in limine to rise to the level of attorney misconduct,
“the order must be specific, the violation must be clear, and unfair prejudice must be shown.”20
Specificity of the order
The pretrial order disallowed the low-impact defense, but, other than stopping Dr. Fish
and other defense witnesses from testifying that Simao’s injuries were not caused by this
collision, it was unclear. The definition of a low-impact defense is “describ[ing] [an] incident of
‘low-impact,’” likening it to “common, everyday experiences.”21 The order here, however,
disallows evidence of all facts happening at any time around the accident, including those before
or after it.
The District Court inconsistently applied the order. Rish described the accident in her
opening statement, sans objection, with later sustained objections to questions directed towards
experts and statements from witnesses describing the accident and its aftermath.
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Clarity of the violation
At least two of the violations were witness statements made by defense witness Dr. Fish.
One statement was made during cross-examination by Simao’s attorney and the other was made
on redirect. Neither statement was directly caused by Rish’s attorney. The other instances
violating the pretrial order did not explain the accident, just Rish’s injuries and the traffic that
day. Those incidents were did not clearly violate the pretrial order.
Unfair prejudice
Unfair prejudice follows when a violation occurs that an objection and admonition to the
jury cannot eliminate.22 Here, the District Court provided no explanation for why jury
instructions could not eliminate prejudice.
The District Court’s instructions were unclear on how Rish could show the jury whether
or not Simao’s injuries were caused by the accident. They instructions also failed to explain how
causation and proximate causation differ. However, those instructions could still clarify any
possible misconduct.
While at least two of the violations rose to the level of a pretrial order violation, the
questions were stricken by the District Court and left unanswered. Therefore, the violations were
not misconduct rising to the level of case-ending sanctions.
Conclusion
The order striking Rish’s answer is vacated and the case reversed and remanded for a
new trial. The District Court erred requiring biomechanical expert testimony to lay the
foundation for low-impact defense, and medical experts may testify as to injuries sustained in a
low-impact defense. Although a party under a sanction order must follow it until overturned,
here, the violations of the sanction order were insignificant enough that a case ending order
striking Rish’s answer was unwarranted.
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